Alfredo Carrillo Obregon and Eli DeLuca
More than eight years after President Trump dusted off Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 to tax US imports of steel and aluminum, no one should be surprised to hear that the president has stretched the meaning of “national security” in the statute (or lack thereof) to impose tariffs on a widening array of products of dubious national security relevance. Since March 2018, the Trump administration has extended the steel and aluminum duties to cover a vast array of steel and aluminum “derivatives” (i.e., products made using these metals) and imposed additional “national security” tariffs on imports of automobiles and auto parts; copper and copper derivatives; timber, lumber, and their derivatives; medium- and heavy-duty trucks, parts thereof, and buses; semiconductors; and pharmaceuticals. (Additional “national security” tariffs on polysilicon and its derivatives are set to go into effect on December 4.)
Yet, perhaps more concerning than this headline expansion in “national security” protectionism is the administration’s move to extend the Section 232 tariffs to cover products that the average American would struggle to connect to the nation’s defense imperatives. For instance, the administration deems refrigerators, washing machines, and air-conditioning (AC) units to be steel derivatives and kitchen cabinets, sofas, and couches to be timber/lumber derivatives, thus levying a 25 percent tariff on imports of these products. Table 1 lists these and other ridiculous examples of nondefense-related products subject to (or soon to be subject to) Section 232 tariffs. Under the guise of protecting and reinvigorating manufacturing industries whose output includes defense and critical infrastructure–related products, the administration is taxing everyday items, even if the mere suggestion that such products pose a threat to the nation’s safety is ludicrous.
Somewhat incredibly, this (non-exhaustive) list used to be even more bizarre. Before the administration overhauled its methodology for assessing “national security” tariffs on steel, aluminum, and copper derivatives in April 2026, it levied tariffs on the metal content of products such as concentrated milk, beer, shampoos, deodorant, cribs, and badminton rackets. While removing tariffs on beer and deodorant is a welcome reprieve, particularly in summertime, the fact that the administration recently proposed adding trumpets, tubas, and trombones to the list of covered metal derivatives shows that the abuse of Section 232 is only set to continue.
The core issue is that this absurdity flows directly from the way the statute is written. As Cato scholars have long argued, Section 232 is in dire need of reforms that, among other things:
tighten the definition of what constitutes a “national security” threat under the statute,
establishes objective criteria and benchmarks for determining whether and which imports constitute such a threat,
require the investigating and administering agencies to consider the public interest of any trade restrictions imposed under the statute, and
provides for a less deferential standard for judicial review of factual determinations made pursuant to it.
Unless Congress steps in and fixes these flaws, Section 232 will remain ripe for abuse as a protectionist device. Expect more household electronics, furniture, and musical instruments to be declared “national security” threats warranting additional taxes—paid (mostly) by Americans.
