The Commerce Department announced this week that six more companies are set to join the federal government’s rapidly expanding corporate portfolio, bringing the total to 30 by our count (see table below). Perhaps most striking about the announcement is how unremarkable government ownership is becoming.
The seven nonbinding letters of intent would provide up to $874 million in CHIPS and Science Act research and development incentives. Six recipients would be new additions to the portfolio. The seventh, GlobalFoundries, already has a proposed Commerce stake attached to a separate $375 million quantum foundry award. Commerce says a minority, noncontrolling equity stake in each company will be a condition of final funding.
Zoom out and the pattern is more striking. Since December, the CHIPS Research and Development (R&D) Office has announced 19 final or proposed company awards totaling up to $3.8 billion. They cover 18 companies because GlobalFoundries has two separate projects. Three agreements are final, while 16 remain letters of intent. All 19 have been publicly tied to equity.
Commerce’s current funding rules state that award recipients may be required to provide equity, warrants, intellectual property licenses, royalties, revenue sharing, or other instruments to generate a government return. The Biden administration, by contrast, used the same CHIPS R&D appropriation through separate competitions to award funds to private companies without taking ownership stakes. That makes the Trump administration’s insistence on equity a policy choice. The CHIPS Act itself authorizes Commerce to make grants, cooperative agreements, and “other transactions” but doesn’t expressly authorize the department to acquire stock.
Commerce says that these stakes enhance the return for taxpayers, but even a profitable portfolio would not resolve the underlying institutional problem. The federal government is now acting as regulator, customer, financier, and shareholder. Decisions involving contracts, trade restrictions, permits, and additional subsidies can affect the value of its holdings. Competitors have reason to question whether the playing field is level. And if a portfolio company falters, Washington will have an added incentive to protect its investment with more taxpayer support.
Calling the stakes “minority” and “noncontrolling” does not eliminate those conflicts. Public announcements often reveal little about valuations, shareholder rights, oversight, or exit plans. Meanwhile, future administrations will inherit the same tool and can use it to assemble portfolios reflecting their own political priorities.
A year ago, these deals looked like a scattered series of one-off improvisations. Commerce now announces companies in batches and openly describes a “portfolio approach.” As I argued in a December 2025 essay, the administration has been assembling a pseudo-sovereign wealth fund under executive control, one deal at a time.
The latest six companies are not especially remarkable. What is remarkable is that federal corporate ownership is becoming routine under a Republican administration, while a Republican-controlled Congress is not just letting it happen but may even enshrine the practice in statute.
Republicans warning that communists are taking over the Democratic Party might first ask why their own administration is so eager to have the government acquire pieces of private companies.
Methodology note: The table excludes Development Finance Corporation (DFC) transactions because Congress expressly authorized DFC to make minority equity investments in the 2018 BUILD Act, years before the second Trump administration. The U.S. Steel golden share is included because it grants the federal government firm-specific veto rights despite carrying no conventional economic interest.
