“I’m here. With you.” With those words, María Corina Machado announced her return to Venezuela on Sunday. It was enough to produce a mass outpouring of Venezuelans into the streets, forming caravans along her hundreds-of-miles journey by land from Barquisimeto to Caracas, where even larger crowds awaited.
The opposition leader delivered no speech, and the spontaneous rallies of support—which also erupted in cities far from her route—were uniformly peaceful. Her presence underscores what has been missing in Venezuela since dictator Nicolás Maduro was removed in January: political legitimacy, of which Machado is the foremost embodiment.
Her return has also begun to belie one of the Trump administration’s working assumptions—that the democratic leader would prove a destabilizing force, provoking chaos and forcing Washington into a major security commitment. That fear was one reason the US had thwarted Machado’s return to Venezuela, which she had attempted unsuccessfully on at least seven previous occasions.
This time was different: Machado was coming back no matter what, and at some point, Washington concluded it could no longer stop her. Delaying her return had also grown unpopular in parts of Florida that were too important to ignore ahead of November’s midterms. Secretary of State Marco Rubio ended up crediting “The conditions allowing for the safe return of Ms. Machado to Venezuela” to “the direct result of the U.S.-supported reconciliation talks.” If so, it is curious why the State Department had not previously publicized such an achievement.
Whatever the reasons for Washington’s policy shift, Machado’s return fundamentally alters the dynamics of Venezuelan politics. It exposes the flaws in the United States’ strategy of prioritizing regime stability followed by economic recovery, to focus only later on democratic transition. The regime’s lack of legitimacy means oil deals and other agreements it strikes with Washington will surely be revised and may even be rejected by future democratic governments, which is precisely why they have failed to attract serious investment. Venezuela under Delcy Rodriguez’s interim dictatorship has otherwise seen a near-total absence of economic reform.
That is why the transition to a legitimate, democratic government always needed to come early. The lack of legitimacy, compounded by an economy that continues to rapidly deteriorate, has produced widespread frustration and discontent that—far from following Washington’s script—has become a source of social instability in its own right.
Machado will be impossible for the regime, Washington, or the opposition figures the US chose to negotiate a transition (without including her or her party) to ignore or continue to sideline. She is the only political figure who commands immense popularity and legitimacy.
One of her objectives will be to secure a firm date for presidential elections—something that has been repeatedly postponed but ought to be set for the middle of next year, if not sooner. A second, larger objective is to channel the public’s frustrations and energy toward politically productive ends. According to Carlos Blanco, a Machado adviser, that means the democratic mobilization of civil society, the strengthening of political alliances, and the promotion of a broad accord on national reconstruction. In a country that has been repressed for decades, beginning that work without delay is essential.
Machado’s return already appears to be bearing fruit. Although Rubio firmly advised “all political actors” (read Machado) to support the transition negotiations that he had put underway and that did not hold high expectations in the minds of many Venezuelans, by late Monday, a “Senior State Department Official” held a press call on background that announced welcome and significant news. Shortly after the end of this year, the official said, a new National Electoral Council will be established, after which Delcy Rodriguez will declare a vacancy in the presidency, beginning “a six-month period for new elections.” Under this scenario, Venezuela could have presidential elections as early as mid-2027.
The date is significant because it aligns with what Machado has been calling for; it is the first time Washington has mentioned a specific election schedule, and it is much earlier than it has hinted at before. It is also a good policy because it gives the country hope and lays the groundwork for an enduring democracy whose first president would almost certainly be the pro-American Machado.
Machado has her work cut out for her. She has to manage Venezuelans’ high expectations while negotiating a complex political transition. But she has already catalyzed that process and is proving to be a stabilizing force in Venezuelan society. Provided Washington increasingly appreciates her pivotal role in establishing a market democracy, the United States and the entire hemisphere stand to benefit.
