Thomas A. Berry and Dan Greenberg
America’s Founders warned against overreach from the national government. They intended the federal government’s role to be limited, with the vast majority of policy issues decided at the state level. The federal government was empowered to regulate commerce “among the several States,” but that power cannot extend to matters that are wholly intrastate.
The Supreme Court now has an opportunity to strengthen the separation of powers between the federal and state governments. The Court will soon decide whether to review a decision that improperly allowed federal power to intrude upon state criminal law. In this case, the federal government indicted Derick Brown under a federal kidnapping law. To stay within constitutional bounds, that statute requires some type of “federal hook” to connect the particular crime to interstate commerce. Among other options, federal jurisdiction is triggered if the defendant used an “instrumentality of interstate or foreign commerce” in committing the kidnapping.
Ms. Brown used a car in the commission of her alleged crime, but the car did not cross state lines. Yet the federal government prosecuted her in federal court all the same, insisting that a car is always an instrumentality of interstate commerce, even if a driver never drives it across state lines. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals accepted the government’s broad argument, holding that “an automobile is per se an instrumentality of interstate commerce.” Ms. Brown has asked the Supreme Court to review her case, and Cato filed an amicus brief supporting that petition.
As our brief explains, the lower court’s per se rule pushes the Interstate Commerce Clause beyond its limits. Commerce “among” the states was historically understood to apply only to trade among people of different states, not to the use of a machine that could hypothetically be used for interstate transportation. And even if federal jurisdiction automatically extends to some types of vehicles, it does not extend to automobiles. Unlike airplanes or trains, automobiles are used daily for purely intrastate activities. If every use of a car triggers federal jurisdiction, then double parking in one’s own neighborhood could be made a federal crime.
This case warrants an urgent review because the circuit courts remain split on whether automobiles are per se instrumentalities of interstate commerce. The Supreme Court should grant review to preserve the Constitution’s structure and boundaries. The improper expansion of the scope of the Commerce Clause usurps the role of judges, undermines the rights of the defendant, and grants the federal government license to wade into quintessentially state matters.












